報告題目：Two tigers in One Mountain: Are there Implicit Collusions in the Corn Seed Market?
時間：2023年12月5日，上午10點，中關村主樓317
報告人：美國威斯康星大學麥迪遜分校 施冠明（Guanming Shi）教授
報告人簡介：施冠明（Guanming Shi），美國威斯康星大學麥迪遜分校教授，博士生導師，農(nóng)業(yè)和應用經(jīng)濟系主任。本科畢業(yè)于復旦大學國際金融系，2005年在UC Berkeley獲得博士學位，同年加入 University of Wisconsin-Madison歷任助理教授，副教授，教授，并長期擔任系研究生招生委員會及研究生項目委員會主任，以及學院學校各類學術委員會成員。她的研究成果發(fā)表于歐美各主要農(nóng)業(yè)和應用經(jīng)濟學學術期刊，如American Journal of Agricultural Economics （AJAE）, Nature Biotechnology, Agricultural Economics等國際知名期刊。她被業(yè)界譽為其領域內(nèi)“最具潛力年輕教授”， 承擔多項美國農(nóng)業(yè)部USDA研究課題，并曾擔任美國自然科學基金NSF評審，及多家學術期刊評審如AJAE, Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, China Economic Review, Ecological Economics等。
報告內(nèi)容簡介：
In a market dominated by a few leading firms, firms can implicitly divide the market and offer different products from their rivals to avoid direct competition. Such implicit collusion can increase firms’ market power to obtain additional profits. We show the difference in the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of implicit collusion between duopoly and those among oligopoly. Using U.S. corn seed market as a case study, we examine whether there is evidence of implicit collusion in setting prices and/or product lines. Results indicate that there is significant collusion in not only price setting stage, but also product line choosing stage. However, the implicit collusion is not symmetric.
（承辦：應用經(jīng)濟系、科研與學術交流中心）
